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ABSTRACT
The data show that an increase in government provided old-age pensions is strongly correlated with
a reduction in fertility. What type of model is consistent with this finding? We explore this question
using two models of fertility, the one by Barro and Becker (1989), and the one inspired by Caldwell
and developed by Boldrin and Jones (2002). In the Barro and Becker model parents have children
because they perceive their children's lives as a continuation of their own. In the Boldrin and Jones'
framework parents procreate because the children care about their old parents' utility, and thus
provide them with old age transfers. The effect of increases in government provided pensions on
fertility in the Barro and Becker model is very small, and inconsistent with the empirical findings.
The effect on fertility in the Boldrin and Jones model is sizeable and accounts for between 55 and
65% of the observed Europe-US fertility differences both across countries and across time and over
80% of the observed variation seen in a broad cross-section of countries. Another key factor affecting
fertility the Boldrin and Jones model is the access to capital markets, which can account for the other



















lej@econ.umn.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
For almost eighty years, TFRs (Total Fertility Rate — the number of children expected
to be born per woman) have been declining in both Europe and the US. This drop
has been quite dramatic, falling from of around 3.0 children per woman in 1920 or
1930 to the current levels of 1.2 to 2.0 children per woman, depending on the country
(with temporary increases of varying sizes, the ’baby booms’). While the downward
trend is common to both sides of the Atlantic, the magnitude of the drop is not. For
example, as of year 2000 the TFR was 1.2 in Italy, 1.3 in Germany, 1.8 in France,
and 2.1 in the US (up from a minimum of about 1.8 in the 1980s). Thus, fertility is
much higher in the US currently than in most of Europe. In 1920, in contrast, TFRs
were higher than now both in the US and Europe but much closer to each other: 3.2
in the US, 3.3 in Denmark, 2.7 in France, 3.2 in Sweden, 4.1 in Spain, and so on.
At that time then, fertility in Europe and the US were roughly similar and they had
been for nearly a century.
In summary, fertility rates in the US and the Western European countries were
roughly similar early on in the 20th century; Between 1940 and 1955-60, depending
upon individual countries, fertility increased in both the USA and Europe, with the
American’s increasing substantially more than the European average; this period is
commonly know as the ”baby boom.” After that, and for about forty ﬁve years now,
TFRs have decreased but, again, the American one has decreased substantially less
than the European generating a persistent diﬀerence in fertility rates between the
two sides of the Atlantic.
This cursory review reveals two facts. First, that after the baby boom period, a
new downward trend in fertility rates began in the late 1950s, which aﬀected both
the USA and most of Europe. Second, that the downward trend was substantially
stronger in Europe than in the US. This has lead to a persistent diﬀerence of between
0.4 and 0.8 children between European and American TFRs. The ﬁr s tf a c th a sa
time dimension: fertility declined sharply over the 20th century, both in the USA
and Europe. The second is one of comparative statics: since the 1950’s fertility has
been lower in Europe than in the USA, and, moreover, the size of this diﬀerence has
increased over time.
The timing of these changes, in conjunction with the idea that one of the principal
motives for having children is for old age support, suggests the possibility that they
might be related to the rapid expansion of government provided pension systems that
took place over this period.1 This coincidence in timing leads us to study the question
more broadly. We construct a cross sectiono ff e r t i l i t ya n dt h es i z eo fg o v e r n m e n t
1Fertility just after WW II is a complex phenomenon. Many countries experienced baby booms,
but none as large as the US. Because of this, it is diﬃcult to draw overall inferences from this
period. Even in 1950, some countries in Europe had substantially lower fertility than the US. As a
rule however, these were countries with substantial Social Security and government pension systems
already in place (e.g., Germany, the UK and the Netherlands).
2provided pensions (along with several other related variables) for 104 countries in
1997. We ﬁnd a strong negative correlation, that is economically signiﬁcant in size,
between these two variables in the cross section.
Accordingly, in this paper we ask: What fraction of each of these three facts,
the observed changes over time and diﬀerences in levels between US and European
fertility and the cross sectional observation from the 1997 data, can be accounted for
by as i n g l ed i ﬀerence in policy — i.e., the timing and size diﬀerences in Social Security
systems, both between Europe and the US, and across the world? The quantitative
model we develop leads to the conclusion that about 50% of the time series drop,
and about 60% of the comparative static diﬀerence, among and between the US
and Europe can be accounted for by the (diﬀerential) growth of the national public
pension systems. We also ﬁnd that a large fraction (over 80%) of the diﬀerences in
fertility identiﬁed in the cross section through regressions is also predicted by the
same theoretical model.
The impact of changing fertility patterns and its connection to government pro-
vided pensions is not a new topic. Indeed, much of the literature on public pension
systems points to the observed long term trends in fertility discussed above (along
with ever growing life expectancies) as signiﬁcant limitations on the ﬁnancial viabil-
ity of the current systems. What is less often discussed are the eﬀects going in the
opposite direction. That is, might the generosity of the pension plans themselves be
one of the causes of these demographic trends?2 This is the view that we explore in
this paper.
In our analysis of cross country data, we ﬁnd that an increase in the size of the
social security system on the order of 10% of GNP is associated with a reduction in
TFR of between 0.7 and 1.6 children (depending on the controls included). These
ﬁndings are highly statistically signiﬁcant and fairly robust to the inclusion of other
possible explanatory variables. Similar estimates are obtained when a panel data
set of the USA and a number of European countries is used. These results comple-
ment and improve upon earlier empirical work on both the statistical determinants
of fertility and it’s relation to the existence and size of government run social secu-
rity systems. Early work using cross sectional evidence includes National Academy
(1971), Friedlander and Silver (1967), and Hohm (1975). Analysis of the relationship
between social security and fertility based on individual country time series include
Swidler (1983) for the U.S., Cigno and Rosati (1996) for Germany, Italy, the UK and
U.S., and Cigno, Casolaro and Rosati (2002) for Germany.
Theoretically, we study the eﬀects of changes of government provided old age
pension plans on fertility in two distinct models — the Barro and Becker (1989) model
of fertility (called the BB model subsequently) and the Caldwell model,3 as developed
2The possibility of a feedback from pensions to fertility has long been argued at the informal
level, see, e.g., National Academy (1971) for an early example, and the literature discussed later for
more formal arguments..
3The idea, as far as we can tell, goes back to Leibenstein (1957); we refer to Caldwell (1978,
3in Boldrin and Jones (2002; labelled the BJ model subsequently). These two models
are grounded in opposite assumptions about intergenerational altruism and, hence,
intergenerational transfers. Both of them have a bearing on late age consumption
and the means through which individuals account for its provision. In the BB model
parents have children because they perceive their children’s lives as a continuation of
their own. In the BJ framework parents procreate because the children care about
their parents’ utility, and thus provide their parents with old age transfers. Thus,
this is a formal implementation of what a number of researchers in demography
would call the “old age security” motivation for childbearing. We ﬁnd that in both
models, any change in steady state fertility arising from changes in the size of pension
systems works through general equilibrium eﬀects, particularly through the eﬀect on
the steady state interest rate. Quantitatively, this eﬀect is small in the BB model,
but economically signiﬁcant in the BJ framework. When the old age security motive
dominates fertility choices, increases in the size of the public pension system decreases
fertility, with perhaps as much as 50% of the reduction in fertility seen in developed
countries in the past 50 years being accounted for by this source alone and over 80% of
the diﬀerence seen in the cross sectional study. Since government provided pensions
are a larger portion of retirement savings for families at the low end of the income
distribution our results are also consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that fertility has
declined more for those individuals.
Within the Caldwell framework, we also consider the impact on fertility that
results from improved access to ﬁnancial instruments to save for retirement. Some
of the empirical studies that have found evidence of a strong correlation between
pensions and fertility have also reported a strong correlation between measures of
accessibility to saving for retirement and fertility (e.g., Cigno and Rosati (1992).) We
provide a simple parameterization of the degree of capital market accessibility and
ﬁnd that even relatively small reductions in ﬁnancial market eﬃciency have strong
impacts on fertility in the Caldwell model; societies where it is harder to save for
retirement or where the return on capital is particularly low, ceteris paribus, have
substantially higher fertility levels.
In sum, these ﬁndings give indirect support for a strong role for the ’old age
security’ motive for fertility. As such, they are generally indicative of a more general
hypothesis — Since children are perceived by parents as a component of their optimal
retirement portfolio, any social or institutional change that aﬀects the economic value
of other components of the retirement portfolio will have a ﬁrst order impact on
fertility choices. The fact that models of children as investments work so well here,
and in a fashion which is consistent, both qualitatively and quantitatively, with the
data, is supportive of this basic hypothesis.
1982) for an informal but clear presentation.
41.1 Relation with Earlier Work
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate the size of the eﬀect of Social
Security on fertility decisions by studying calibrated, quantitative, versions of the
theoretical models. To our knowledge, no previous authors have undertaken such an
endeavor, but a large literature exists that anticipates our work along various dimen-
sions. Empirical analyses of the correlation between fertility indices and diﬀerent
measures of the size or the generosity of the public pension system go back to Hohm
(1975). He examines 67 countries, using data from the 1960-1965 periods and con-
cludes that social security programs have a measurable negative eﬀect on fertility of
about the same magnitude as the more traditional long-run determinants of fertility,
i.e., infant mortality, education, and per capita income.
Cigno and Rosati (1992) present a co-integration analysis of Italian fertility, sav-
ing, and social security taxes. They study the potential impact on fertility of both
the availability of public pensions and the increasing ease with which ﬁnancial in-
struments can be used to provide for old age income. They conclude that ”[...] both
social security coverage and the development of ﬁnancial markets, controlling for the
other explanatory variables, aﬀect fertility negatively.” (p. 333). Their long-run
quantitative ﬁndings, covering the period 1930-1984 are particularly interesting in
the light of one of the models we use here. The point estimates of the (negative)
impact of social security and capital market accessibility on fertility are practically
identical (Figure 8, p. 338) to what we ﬁnd here.
The theoretical eﬀects of pension systems on fertility have been studied exten-
sively. Early work includes Bental (1989), Cigno (1991), and Prinz (1990) in addition
to the original discussion in Becker and Barro (1988). More recent examples include
Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Cigno and Rosati (1992), Cigno (1995), Rosati (1996),
Swidler (1981, 1983), Wigger (1999), Yakita (2001), Yoon and Talmain (2001), Zhang
(2001), and Zhang, Zhang and Lee (2001), among others. These papers cover diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of both models of fertility, as we do here, but are substantially more
limited in scope and, in particular, they do not study the quantitative theoretical
predictions of their models. For example, in both the Nishimura and Zhang and the
Cigno papers, models are analyzed which are based on reverse altruism like that in
Boldrin and Jones. However, they assume that all generations make choices simul-
taneously and hence, parental care provided by children does not react to changes
in savings behavior. Moreover, they do not make the size of the intergenerational
transfer endogenous, which, among other things, prevent them from considering the
problem of shirking in parental care resulting from the public goods problem among
siblings that is created when reverse altruism is present.
Closer in spirit to our work are the two articles by Ehrlich and Lui (1991, 1998) in
which the relation between exogenous social security taxes, and endogenous fertility
and human capital investment are analyzed using a model of intrafamily insurance
markets. As in BJ, the motivation for having children comes from the old age secu-
rity hypothesis, but the transfer from children to parents is assumed to be in ﬁxed
5proportion to the investment, by parents, in the education of children. Their main
result is that an increase in social security taxes lowers fertility, savings, or human
capital formation, and possibly all three, depending on parameter values and other
details of the model. The theoretical message is, therefore, analogous to the one de-
rived here. We add to their analysis by including capital accumulation, endogenizing
the transfers from children to parents and conducting quantitative analyses of the
eﬀects. Ehrlich and Kim (2005), is the paper that is closest to ours in terms of goals.
Using an approach based on altruistic parents (i.e., similar to the BB model but also
including both mate-search and human capital), they ﬁnd that increases in the size
of the Social Security system on fertility is negative, but smaller than what we ﬁnd
here. For example, in their baseline calibration, they ﬁnd that decreasing social se-
curity tax rates from 10% to 0% increases fertility by approximately 0.1 children per
woman. This eﬀe c ti sl a r g e rt h a nw h a tw eﬁnd for the BB model, but this diﬀerence
is probably due to the other diﬀerences in the models.4
In studying the dynastic model of endogenous fertility we reach conclusions that
are partially diﬀerent from those advanced in the original papers. As mentioned
above, Becker and Barro (1988) argue that a growing social security system should
reduce fertility. Their analysis is based on a partial equilibrium argument according
to which a social security system “...has the same substitution eﬀect as an increase
in the cost of raising a child [...] therefore [...] holding ﬁxed the marginal utility
of wealth [...], and the interest rate, we found that fertility declines in the initial
generation while fertility in later generations does not change.” That is, there will be
a transitional eﬀect of lower fertility when the system is introduced, followed by a
return to the original fertility level in steady state. Our analysis (see the Appendix
for details) shows that, even in a partial equilibrium context, these conclusions are
dependent on how fast the pension system grows, relative to the rate of interest. In a
general equilibrium model, both the interest rate and the marginal utility of wealth
adjust in such a way that an increase in fertility occurs in the new BGP. Furthermore,
there is no evidence in the data of a return to the previous level of fertility after a
transition in those countries which have adopted a social security system during the
last century, as would be predicted by the partial equilibrium argument. 5
A number of other authors in the demography and sociology literatures have pro-
vided evidence of the strong empirical link between parental dependence on oﬀspring’s
support in late age and fertility rates. This literature is too large to be fully reviewed
here. Of particular note for our purposes are the papers by Rendal and Bahchieva
(1998) and Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın and Romeu (2003). Rendal and Bahchieva (1998) use data
4Mochida (2005) also studies the eﬀects of SS sytems (and child subsidies) on fertility in a BB
type model, and ﬁnds that the size of the SS system decreases fertility, but does not present any
quantitative analysis.
5Cigno and Rosati (1992) also use a simpliﬁed two-period version of the dynastic model claiming
that fertility decreases when a (lump-sum) social security transfer to the ﬁst generation is increased.
This also diﬀers from the result we report in the Appendix, to which we refer for a more detailed
discussion.
6on poor and disabled elderly in the USA to estimate the market value of the support
they receive from relatives. These are largely in the form of time inputs in the house-
hold production function. They ﬁnd that children are a valuable economic investment
for the poorest ﬁfty per cent of the population even in the presence of current social
security and old age welfare programs. Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ına n dR o m e u( 2 0 0 3 )u s em i c r o
data measuring parental health care eﬀort and expenditure and also ﬁnd substantial
backing for the ‘old age support’ hypothesis of fertility decisions.
In section 2, we look at data: ﬁrst we discuss the last 70 years or so of fertility both
in Europe, and in the US, next, we present statistical evidence on the relationship
between the size of the social security system and fertility using both cross section
and panel data. In section 3, we lay out the basics of the Caldwell model and
derive the system of balanced growth equations for the model as a function of the
characteristics of the Social Security system. In section 4 we calibrate this model to
match the US data for 2000 and evaluate the ability of the model to quantitatively
capture diﬀerences across time and across countries that we see in the data in section
5. Sensitivity analysis on parameter values and the eﬀects of limited access to credit
markets are discussed in section 6. Conclusions are oﬀered in section 7. In the
Appendix, we present the analog of sections 3-6 for the BB model.
2D a t a a n d S t y l i z e d F a c t s
In this section, we present evidence, from comparative studies of US and European
systems, from Cross Section and from a panel of European countries, on the relation-
ship between the size of government pension plans and fertility.
2.1 A Brief History of Fertility in Europe and the US: 1930-
2000
As already mentioned, we are interested in understanding how much of the following
two facts, depicted in Figures 1 and 2 below, can be accounted for by the diﬀerence
in the national social security systems.
Fact 1: Both in Europe and in the USA fertility rates, as measured by the Total
Fertility Rate, have decreased constantly over most of the 20th century. The total
variation over the ﬁfty-year period 1950-2000 is about 1.3 children per woman in
Europe, where it has fallen from about 2.8 to about 1.5, and about 1.0 in the USA,
where it has fallen from about 3.0 to about 2.0.
Fact 2: While in 1920 the average TFRs in Europe and the USA were roughly
equal, in 2000 they are about 0.4-0.8 children apart (depending on country); the TFR
in the USA is at 2.0 children per woman, while in Europe it is between 1.2 and 1.6
children per woman.
There are several other relevant facts to keep in mind when interpreting these
7diﬀerences in the historical patterns of fertility in the US and Europe. In the demo-
graphic literature, two factors are usually treated as the main driving forces behind
long run movements in fertility: reductions in Infant Mortality Rates and increases
in Female Labor Force Participation Rates (FLFPR).
While IMR might be reasonably thought of as exogenous in individual fertility
decisions, labor force participation is clearly endogenous to household decisions. As
such, any explanation of variations in TFR based on variations in FLFPR only begs
f o rt h ec o m m o nf a c t o r ( s )a ﬀecting both. Leaving this objection aside, it is also clear
from the data that the facts cannot be accounted for on the basis of the correlation
between TFR and FLFPR. While it is true that FLFPRs have increased over time in
both Europe and the US, this has occurred at very diﬀerent rates. Moreover, over the
last twenty years the cross country correlation between TFR and FLFPR has turned
positive instead of negative (Adsera (2004)). In particular, current LFPRs are higher
i nt h eU St h a ni nE u r o p e ,w h i l eT F R sa r el o w e ri nE u r o p e . T h u s ,w h i l et h et i m e
series changes in TFRs in each individual country are consistent with an increase in
FLFPR and a negative correlation between TFR and FLFPR this explanation alone
cannot account for the cross sectional evidence. Indeed, the cross sectional evidence
would require the opposite correlation.
Similar, even if less extreme, problems arise with the IMR. The separate time series
behavior of TFRs in Europe and the USA are consistent with the observed drop in
IMR; the respective drops in IMR were from 37/1000 for the USA to about 7/1000
(from 1950 to 2000) and, from values between 22/1000 and 60/1000 (depending on
the country) to values between 4/1000 and 7/1000 in Europe. Taking 0.030 as our
point estimate of the correlation between IMR and TFR (which is halfway between
the two estimates of Regressions II and IV given below), the observed time series
variations in country by country IMR can account for a drop in fertility that ranges
from 0.5 (Sweden) to 1.6 (Spain) children per woman. But an elasticity of 0.030
cannot possibly account for the current diﬀerences in TFR between the USA and
Europe, neither now nor ﬁfty years ago. Mortality rates among infants are basically
identical on the two sides of the Atlantic these days, and were higher, not lower, in
Europe than in the US in the 1950s. Hence, while a reduction in IMRs has certainly
played a role, along the lines of, e.g., Boldrin and Jones (2002), in the fertility decline
of both the USA and Europe, this explanation also has diﬃculty with the observed
cross sectional diﬀerences over this period.
Similar problems arise with other putative explanations, e.g., increases in income
per capita, female education levels ,o ri nt h ed e g r e eo fu r b a n i z a t i o n .
Thus, to account coherently for both facts on the basis of changes in factors that
are usually associated to long run movements in fertility, appears diﬃcult.
In contrast, the size and timing of the growth in government pension systems
correlates well with both the time series and cross sectional observations: Beginning
shortly after WWII the size and relevance of social security were roughly the same in
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Figure 1: TFR in the USA: 1800-1990
but this increase has been much more dramatic in Europe than in the USA. When
the system was ﬁrst introduced in the US, it was quite small — there were about ﬁfty
thousand beneﬁciaries in 1937, and only two hundred thousand in 1940; it is only
right after WWII that the system takes oﬀ, and in 1950 the number of beneﬁciaries
reached 3.5 million. Thus, as an approximation, the size of the pension system was
0% of labor income in 1935;6 currently, tax receipts and payments are approximately
10% of labor income. In Europe, the payments of the systems were also approximately
0% of labor income in 1935, but the growth has been much more dramatic, in some
countries pension payments stand as high as 20 to 25% of labor income. The history
of the U.K system lies someplace in between; for details compare the historical section
of the chapters in Gruber and Wise (1999) dedicated to European countries.
We would be remiss if we did not point out the anomalous behavior of fertility
rates behaved during the 1920-1950 period both in Europe and in the US (where the
changes are larger). In both, measured TFR, which had been steadily decreasing
since 1800 in parallel with the decrease in Infant Mortality Rates and the increase
in urbanization, took a sharp swing downward around 1920, reaching particularly
low levels during the 1930-1940 decade. Fertility snapped back to much higher levels
(about 50% higher, in fact) during the ‘baby boom’ period — 1940 to 1960 — after
which it decreased again to the current low levels.7 Both of these movements are
6See http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html for more details on the US SS system.
7This pattern is even more striking in the time series of ‘completed fertility’ by cohort, the total
number of children per capita that women of a given cohort have over their life time. Using that
measure, women born between 1880 and 1915 averaged about 2.2 births over their lifetimes. This






















Figure 2: TFR’s in Europe: 1900 to 1990
hard to account for on the basis of movements in the standard variables used by
demographers to track long fun movements in fertility (IMR, urbanization, female
education, and the other, assorted socioeconomic variables used in empirical studies).
Thus, although explaining the whole 1920-1960 fertility ’swing’ is a fascinating and
challenging task, it will not be taken up here.8
2.2 Cross Sectional Data
The loose, but suggestive, discussion of the relative sizes and timing of changes in
government pension systems in Europe and the US and their relationship to observed
changes in fertility given above is further strengthened by an examination of cross
sectional evidence. We examine a Cross Section of 104 countries taken from 1997.
climbed to a peak of about 3.1 for women born around 1935 and then slowly fell, reaching 2.0 for the
1950 birth cohort. Since this statistic matches up better with the concept of life time fertility choices
for a given individual, this is even more telling; the dramatically diﬀerent fertility choices of women
born between 1880 and 1915 and of those born between 1915 and 1935 cry for an explanation.
8See the paper by Greenwood, Seshadri and Vandenbroucke (2005) for one attempt at modelling
this phenomenon in the US.
10The raw data is shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Cross-country correlation, SS tax and TFR
Although one must be careful about causal interpretations, the data in cross
section show a strong negative relationship between the Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
in a country and the size of its Social Security and pension system. This plots TFR
for the country in 1997 versus Social Security expenditures as a fraction of GDP in
1997, denoted SST, for these countries. Since this second variable is a measure of
the average tax rate for the Social Security system as a whole, we identify it with
the Social Security Tax (SST) in what follows. Although the relationship is far from
perfect, as can be seen, there is a strong negative relationship between these two
variables. Most notably, there are only four countries for which SST is at least 6%
and TFR is above 2 (children per woman).9
In contrast to this, in those countries where TFR is above 3, none has an SST
above 4%. This is suggestive of the overall relationship between these two variables.
Regression results from this data set conﬁrm and quantify the visual impression, as
summarized in the table below.10 For cross section regressions, the dependent variable
is TFR, SST is the Social Security tax rate estimated as total expenditures on the
Social Security System as a fraction of GDP (in 1997), GDP is per capita GDP in
9The source for this data is the ”World Development Indicators”, 2002, published by the World
Bank.
10Values of t-statistics in parenthesis. Similar regressions on data for 1990, conﬁrm and strenghten
these results. Details available from authors upon request.
111995 (in USD 1,000 ), IMR is the Infant Mortality Rate, estimated as the number of
deaths per 1,000 live births (in 1997).
Regression I II III IV






























n 104 101 122 119
R2 .34 .77 .63 .71
Table 1: Fertility and Social Security, Cross Section and Country Panel
As can be seen, the coeﬃcient on SST is negative and highly statistically signif-
icant. It is also economically signiﬁcant. Most LDCs have either no social security
system or a very small one. In contrast, SST is between 7% and 16% for most de-
veloped countries, but only European countries have ratios above 10%. Thus, the
relevant range for calculations is in changes in SST from 0% (0.00) to 10% (0.10).
Our regressions imply that, everything else the same, an increase in SST of this size
(i.e., from 0% to 10%) is associated with a reduction in the number of children per
woman of between 0.7 and 1.6. In Regression II, we include two other variables that
might either give alternative explanations for the results in column I or allow for a
sharper estimation of the conditional correlation between SST and TFR. They are per
capita GDP and IMR. Although the size and signiﬁcance of SST do fall somewhat,
it remains substantially negative and statistically signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient on
GDP is not signiﬁcant; the coeﬃcient on IMR has the expected positive sign and is
highly signiﬁcant, which is consistent with the quantitative theoretical predictions of
Boldrin and Jones (2002). We also did regressions including education variables from
the Barro-Lee data set as additional predictors. The addition of these variables left
the coeﬃcient estimates on SST and IMR virtually unchanged and still highly signif-
icant. The addition of these variables, while not signiﬁcant themselves, did increase
the size of the GDP coeﬃcient and made it statistically signiﬁcant.11
11For this, we used the average years of education of males and females 15 and over. Since this
122.3 A Small Panel Study
We ﬁnd similar results when we look at panel data. Here, we look at a panel data
set of TFRs and SST’s in 8 developed countries over the period from 1960 to the
present.12 The 8 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland,
Norway and Spain. A summary of the data is shown in Figure 4. The columns labeled
Regression III and IV show the results of two simple regressions for this panel data
set. (Uncorrected for autocorrelation and/or heteroscedasticity.) The variables here
have the following meaning: TFR is still Total Fertility Rate in that country/year,
SST is the social security tax rate measured as social security expenditure over labor
earnings, IMR is as before, and 65% is the share of the population aged 65 or older;
p e rc a p i t aG D Ph a sb e e no m i t t e da si ti sn e v e rs i g n i ﬁcant.
Figure 4: SS tax and TFR in 8 European Countries
The results from this panel regression are qualitatively similar to what we saw
above in the cross section— viz., an increase in SST leads to a reduction in TFR,
data is only available for 1990, we used data on TFR, SST and IMR from that year as well. The
estimated coeﬃcients on SST and IMR we obtained were -12.0 and 0.029 respectively. Details
available from the authors upon request.
12The data on Social Security for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and
Norway is from MZES (Mannheimer Zentrum f¨ ur Europ¨ aische Sozialforschung) and EURODATA
in cooperation with ILO (International Labour Organization) ”The Cost of Social Security: 1949-
1993”. For Spain, the data comes from private communication from Sergi Jimenez Martin.
13even after controlling for IMR and for the share of elderly people in the population.
Quantitative comparisons are more delicate, as the measure for SST adopted here
diﬀers from the previous one. Still, if one takes the rough, but overall accurate,
approximation that labor earnings are 2/3 of GNP, then an increase in the social
security expenditure over GDP from 5% to 15% is associated also in the panel data
with a fall in TFR of between 1.0 and 1.8. children per woman, similar to the
estimates in the cross section data.
These ﬁn d i n g sa r es u b j e c tt ot h es a m ec a u t i ons which always accompany regres-
sion studies, but they are highly suggestive that SST may indeed have an eﬀect on
fertility decisions, that this eﬀect is to reduce the number of children that people
have, and that this eﬀect is fairly large in size: an increase of the social security
system on the order of 10% of GDP is associated with a reduction in TFR of between
0.7 and 1.6 children per woman.
These results are of considerable interest but also must be interpreted with care.
In many countries, the social security system not only provides old-age insurance (i.e.,
an annuity) ﬁnanced with an ad-hoc tax on labor income, but also has an element
of forced savings. That is, the beneﬁts paid out to an individual are dependent, to
varying degrees in diﬀerent countries, on the contributions made over the working
lifetime of the payee. Because of this, the exact relationship between SST in these
regressions and the social security tax rate in subsequent sections is imperfect. That
is, in the models, we will assume that SST is ﬁnanced through a labor income tax and
is paid out lump sum. Thus, from the point of view of testing the model predictions,
we would ideally like to have data on that part of SST that most closely mirrors our
lump-sum payment mechanism. Data limitations prevent us from attempting this,
however. Thus, the eﬀective change in the SST that is relevant for the models is
probably smaller than what we have found in the previous regressions.
3 Social Security in the Caldwell Model of Fertil-
ity
In this section, we lay out the basic model of children as a parental investment in
old age care. In doing this, we follow the development in Boldrin and Jones (2002)
quite closely. That is, we assume that there is an altruistic eﬀect going from children
to parents, that parents know that this is present, and that they use it explicitly in
choosing family size. Thus, the utility of children is increasing in the consumption
of their parents, when the latter are in the third and last period of their lives. In
our calibration exercise an eﬀort is made to impose a certain degree of discipline
on our modeling choice; we use available micro evidence to calibrate the size of
the intergenerational transfers in relation to wage and capital income. In modeling
the pension system we will make the simplifying assumption that Social Security
payments go only to the old and are lump sum. In many real world Social Security
14Systems, pensions typically have a redistributive component in addition to an annuity
structure. We will abstract from these considerations for simplicity. It is likely that,
since social security systems are a larger fraction of overall wealth for those agents
in the lower part of the income distribution, and those individuals also have slightly
more children, inclusion of this source of heterogeneity would only increase the size
of the eﬀects that we are capturing here.
Our baseline characterization of the Social Security system is therefore one in
which pensions are lump-sum, while ﬁnancing is provided via a payroll tax. Accord-
ingly, let To
t denote the transfer received by the old in period t,a n dl e tτt denote the
labor income tax rate on the middle aged in period t.
As is standard in fertility models, we will write the cost of children in terms of
both goods and labor time components (at and btwt, respectively). We assume that
l a b o ri si n e l a s t i c a l l ys u p p l i e d ,b u tt h a ti tc a nb eu s e de i t h e rf o rm a r k e tw o r ko rf o r
child-rearing. Thus, total labor income, after taxes is given by (1 − τt)wt(1 − btnt),
where nt denotes the number of young people born at time t. Capital, which in our
formulation encompasses all kinds of durable assets, is owned by the old; a fraction
of its total value is assumed to be automatically transferred to the middle-aged at
the end of the period. We will also assume that the pension system is of the “pay as
you go” kind, so that, in equilibrium, To
t = nt−1τtwt(1 − btnt). Notice that we use
superscripts, y, m,a n do to denote, respectively, young, middle-age and old people.
Thus, the problem of an agent i,b o r ni np e r i o dt − 1, i =1 ,...,nt−1,i st o :







subject to the constraints:
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t+1 +( 1− ξ)Rt+1xt+1 + T
o
t+1
xt+1 ≤ ξRtxt/nt−1 + st.
Here, cm
t i st h ec o n s u m p t i o no fam i d d l ea g e dp e r s o ni np e r i o dt, co
t is the con-
sumption of an old person, st is the amount of savings, nt is the number of children,
di
t is the level of support the agent gives to his/her parents, xt is the amount of the
capital stock each old person controls in period t, wt i st h ew a g er a t e ,Rt is the gross
return on capital in the period, To
t is the lump sum transfer received when old, and τt
15is the Social Security tax rate on labor income. We assume that the decision maker,
i,t a k e sd
j
t, j 6= i,j =1 ,...,nt−1, xt, nt−1, Rt, Rt−1,a n dt h et a x e s ,To
t , To
t+1 and τt
as given. Among other things, this implies that, when choosing a donation level, the
representative middle age agent does not cooperate with his own siblings to maximize
total utility. Instead, he takes their donations to the parents as given, and maximizes
his own utility by choosing a best response level of donations.13 Also, note that we
have assumed that middle aged individuals work, but that the elderly do not; we do
not model here the impact that a Social Security system may or may not have on




t + st + c
m
t + θt(τ)nt ≤ (1 − τt)wt,
where θt(τt)=at+(1−τt)btwt.S i n c eθt is exogenous to the individual decision maker,
using this shorthand will simplify the presentation. In addition to introducing a social
security tax and transfers, we also have deviated from the original Boldrin&Jones
paper in that we have included a change in the law of motion of wealth per old
person:
xt+1 = ξRtxt/nt−1 + st.
The parameter ξ aﬀords us a simple way of modeling diﬀerences, across coun-
tries at a given time, and across time in a given country, in both the inheritance
mechanisms and the access to ﬁnancial institutions. This will allow us to study the
idea that increased access to ﬁnancial markets increases the rate of return on private
savings to physical capital, which also lessens the value of within-family support in
old age, thereby causing fertility to fall. This captures capital depreciation while
providing some freedom in our handling of the eﬀective life-time rate of return on
wealth accumulation. To do this we proceed as follows. Let 0 < δ < 1 be the depre-
ciation rate per period. Write Rt =( 1− δ)+Fk(K,AL), where F is the aggregate
production function, K is capital, L is aggregate labor supply and A is the level of
TFP; subscripts denote, here and in what follows, partial derivatives. We will let ξ
range in the interval [0,1]. When ξ = 0 capital markets are fully operational, there
are no involuntary or legally imposed bequests, and old people are able to consume
the total return from their middle age savings. On the contrary, when ξ =1 ,o l d
people have no control whatsoever on their savings, which are entirely and directly
passed to the oﬀsprings, whom in turn will be unable to get anything out of them,
a n ds oo n . I nt h i se x t r e m ec a s e ,n os a v i n gw ill take place and children’s donations
13In Boldrin&Jones (2002) we call this behavior “non-cooperative” and contrast it with a “coop-
erative” behavior in which members of the same generation choose donations in such a way that the
sum of their utilities is maximized.
16are the only viable road to consumption in old age. As usual, reality ﬁts somewhere
in between these two extremes, as discussed in the calibration section.
After substituting in the constraints and using symmetry for donations of future
children, this problem can be reformulated as one of solving:
max
st,nt,dt
V (st,n t,d t),
where the concave maximand is deﬁned as
V (s,n,d)=


























































Assuming now that u(c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ), the three ﬁrst order conditions can be

































14These ﬁrst order conditions require conjectures, on the part of the period t decision-makers,
about how the future will unfold. Here, we assume that they understand that any changes in period
t decisions will give rise to adjustments in the next periods donations according to the static FOC
of their children. This can be justiﬁed as a Markov Perfect Equilibrium through the use of trigger
strategies. The characterization of other MPE outcomes is the topic of ongoing research by the
authors.
17Substituting in the budget constraints and imposing symmetry in the choice of do-
nations (i.e., that dt = d
j
t) equation (1) gives:
nt−1dt +( 1− ξ)Rtxt + T
o
t = ζ
1/σ [(1 − τt)wt − dt − st − θtnt].




















[nt−1 ((1 − τt)wt − st − θtnt)+( 1− ξ)Rtxt + T
o
t ].


































What remains is to determine the three prices wt, Rt,a n dθt from the other endoge-





t + nt−1atnt + nt−1st ≤ Yt = F(xt,A tnt−1(1 − btnt)),
where xt is the amount of capital per old person, and Lt = Atnt−1(1 − btnt)i st h e
amount of labor supplied per old person; F is assumed to be CRS. From this, it
follows that
wt = F`(xt,A tnt−1(1 − btnt)),
Rt = Fk(xt,A tnt−1(1 − btnt)), and,
θt = at +( 1− τt)btwt.
Thus, given the initial conditions n−1, n0, x0, the sequence of exogenous variables
at, bt, At, τt,a n dTo
t , and the model’s parameters, the full system of equations
determining the equilibrium sequences is thereby obtained.
183.1 Exogenous Growth and BGPs
We assume that there is exogenous labor augmenting technological change, At =
γt
AA0. As it is well known, for there to be balanced growth it must also be that
at = γt
Aa0, bt = b,a n dτt = τ. Accordingly we deﬁne the de-trended variables in the






A, ˆ dt = dt/γt
A,ˆ st = st/γt





A. Finally, we denote nt/nt−1 = γnt. Under our assumptions, if ˆ xt,
ˆ st,a n dγnt converge to constants then, so do ˆ wt, Rt,a n dˆ θt and, consequently, the




















































(1 − τ)ˆ w − ˆ s − ˆ θγn
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m =( 1− τ)ˆ w(1 − bγn) − ˆ aγn − ˆ d − ˆ s (9)
ˆ c









19ˆ w = F`(ˆ x,A0γn(1 − bγn)), (12)
R =( 1− δ)+ Fk(ˆ x,A0γn(1 − bγn)), (13)
ˆ θ =ˆ a +( 1− τ)bˆ w,( 1 4 )
ˆ T
o = γnτ ˆ w(1 − bγn). (15)










¿From the above equation it is clear that steady state fertility only depends on
the preference parameters ζ, β,a n dσ, the exogenous rate of growth of technologi-
cal progress γA, the equilibrium interest rate, R, and the degree of capital market
imperfection ξ. This implies that the other parameters, such as the costs of having
children or the size of the social security system, impact steady state fertility only in-
directly, through general equilibrium eﬀects embedded in the interest rate. Therefore,
in small closed economies, or in economies with a linear technology and ﬁxed prices,
there would be no such eﬀects. Most notably, fertility would be invariant to both the
size of the social security system and the costs of having children. The Barro and
Becker model of fertility, as shown in the Appendix, displays a similar feature. In
both models, the eﬀects of social security on fertility come from general equilibrium
eﬀects.
Increasing ξ corresponds to forcing the old to pass on more of their savings to
their children and thus represents reducing access to capital markets. This has a
direct eﬀect on the growth rate of population as can be seen. Surprisingly, holding R
constant and increasing ξ causes γn to fall, the opposite of what one would expect.
There is also an indirect eﬀect of a change in ξ on R. A careful examination of the
RofR condition shows that the indirect eﬀect goes in the opposite direction. In fact,
due to the general equilibrium equalizatio no ft h er a t eo fr e t u r no ns a v i n gw i t ht h e
rate of return on fertility, an increase in ξ leads to lower investment in physical capital
and, hence, a higher value of R in equilibrium. Because of these oﬀsetting eﬀects, the
overall impact of more eﬃcient capital markets on the value of (1 − ξ)R and, hence,
on the growth rate of population depends on parameters. In section 6, below, we ﬁnd
that the overall eﬀect is negative as would be expected.
The detailed analysis of Social Security in the Barro and Becker model is presented
in the Appendix. As with the Caldwell model, it turns out that any eﬀects on steady
state fertility from changes in the size of a PAYGO Social Security System must come
through indirect eﬀects working oﬀ changes in the equilibrium interest rate.
In sum then, neither of the two models delivers an explicit and unambiguous
prediction about the direction of the eﬀect of the introduction of a PAYGO social
20security system on fertility and the growth rate of population. Thus, any eﬀect can
only be identiﬁed through a more thorough, quantitative exercise. This is what we
turn to next.
4C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section, we present quantitative comparative statics results for calibrated
versions of the two models. We start by calibrating the model economies to match
some key facts of the US economy in 2000. We have also done extensive sensitivity
analysis with respect to all of the parameter values. We have found that our key
conclusions are the same for a wide range of most parameter values, but they are
sensitive to the calibration of utility function parameters; we discuss this at the end.
Throughout, we assume that a period is 20 years; this choice distorts some of the
model’s predictions as it implies that, over the life cycle, the number of working
and retirement years is the same, whereas they stand in a ratio of 2 to 1 in reality.
For the Caldwell model we consider the case where ﬁnancial markets are frictionless,




Recall from Section 3 that for the Caldwell model, the period utility function is





















We assume that the production function is CRS with constant depreciation, and
is given by:
(1 − δ)K + F(K,L)=( 1− δ)K + AK
αL
1−α
Inputs and output markets are assumed competitive.
4.2 Facts to Match
Setting ξ = 0, there are a total of nine parameters in the Caldwell model.
21A number of these parameters are used in macroeconomic models of growth and
the business cycle, hence, in calibrating them we follow the existing literature for as
many as we can. Accordingly, we normalize A to 1, we set annual depreciation to
8%, and we ﬁx the share of income that goes to capital to either 0.22 or 0.33.15 We
have set the parameter γA equal to 1.25% on a yearly basis following Oliveira Peires
and Garcia (2004) estimation for developed countries over the 1970-2000 period, and
Dennison’s calculations for the 20th century USA.
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,w eh a v em a d et h ec h o i c et os e tt h er e l a t i v ew e i g h t so nt h eﬂow utility
from current consumption of the old (ζ) to be one for both models. While it makes
our life easier, this choice implies, obviously, that on a per capita basis consumption of
old parents is equal to that of middle age children. This contradicts the evidence from
the empirical life time consumption literature that suggests a drop in all measures
of per capita consumption after retirement; estimates of the ratio between average
consumption while working and while retired yield values of about 0.70 − 0.80. For
this ratio to be obtained by co/cm we need to set ζ < 1.0. The impact of this diﬀerent
calibration is also considered in the section on Sensitivity Analysis, below.
Given these choices, we still need to determine the values of the four parameters β,
σ, a,a n db. To make our results as clear as possible, for each model we consider two
extreme cases: one in which all of the costs of raising children are in terms of goods
(b = 0), the other in which they are completely in terms of time ( a = 0). This implies
calibrating three parameters at a time. The model makes either explicit or implicit
predictions about a large number of potentially measurable variables that could be
used to help in the calibration: the real rate of return on safe investments, donations
as a share of income or consumption, the total fertility rate and the growth rate of
t h ep o p u l a t i o n ,t h ea m o u n to ft i m ea n d / o rr esources devoted to rearing children, the
composition of the population by age group, etcetera. As we must pin down only
three parameters we need three independent observations.
To do this, the ﬁrst step is to choose the country and the historical period the
calibrated model is anchored to. Several alternatives are possible, the most obvious
choices would be to use data from either the US or Europe at some point in time
before government pension programs took oﬀ. The US Social Security Administration
was created in 1935, thus it would seem natural to calibrate to the USA in 1935.
15T h ec h o i c eo fα = .22 comes from the macroeconomic home production literature, e.g., McGrat-
tan, Rogerson and Wright (1997), while the choice of α = .33 is typical of the aggregate business
cycle literature. The diﬀerence between these two values is due to the recognition that much of
the measured capital stock (residential real estate and durable goods) but a relatively smaller share
of measured output (inputed service from residential housing) is properly assigned to home pro-
duction. Depending on which classiﬁcation one adopts, the measured capital/output ratio varies
substantially. Our model does not include home production and, as such, we ﬁnd the value of
α = .33 more coherent; nevertheless we have performed simulations with both values to check for
the robustness of the basic results. An interesting extension of this work would follow the home
production literature more closely using both parental time and home capital goods to produce,
jointly, child care and other home goods. This is beyond the scope of the current paper.
22However, the period 1930-1950 is also characterized by two anomalous events — the
Second World War and the Great Depression. In principle both events might have
had a major impact on fertility rates, and they certainly had large impacts on the
capital-output ratio, measured TFP, and the rate of return on capital; the latter are
all relevant macro variables we are taking into consideration to calibrate our model.
For these reasons, we calibrate the model to observations from 2000. Because the USA
is much more homogeneous than Europe, and because we have already set a number
of model’s parameters on the basis of USA observations, our calibration benchmark
is the USA in year 2000.
The independent observations we aim at matching are the TFR, the capital-output
ratio, and the childbearing costs. In the USA the TFR was at 1.75 in 1980, at 2.03
in 1990, and it is around 2.06 currently. Thus, we will take a TFR of 2.00 to be
the current “steady-state” level. From Maddison (1995a, b) we take the capital to
output ratio to be between 2.4 and 2.5. We also need to have an estimate of the cost
of raising a child. Focus ﬁrst on the case in which this cost is entirely in time, i.e.,
a =0 ,a n db>0. For this, we set b to be 3% of the available family time, which
corresponds to roughly 6% of the mother’s time per child. When total fertility is
about 2.0 children per woman this number is consistent with the estimates on time-
use data reported by Juster and Staﬀord (1991), with the one estimated by Echevarria
and Merlo (1999) using data ﬁtted to an international cross section, and also with
the estimates reported by Moe (1998) based on Peruvian micro data. This number
(b = 3%) may seem surprisingly low, in fact the opposite is true. In our context, the
fraction b is applied to the total time available for work during the whole working life,
while the 6% of mother’s time per child reported in the quoted studies refers only to
the infancy-childhood years, which are generally substantially fewer than the active
years of a mother. From this point of view, then, a value of b between 2% and 2.5%
may be more appropriate; again, we refer to the Sensitivity Analysis section for this
case.
Finally, the parameters describing the Social Security system must be chosen for
the model. The exact form of the US Social Security system is much more complex
than what we allow for here. Payments received depend, to some extent, on what
was paid in and are therefore not exactly lump-sum. Figure 5 shows the time paths
of both receipts and expenditures of the Social Security system from 1937 to date.
These ﬁgures include both Social Security and Medicare, but omit Social Security
Disability Insurance since this is not restricted to the elderly. As can be seen these are
approximately 7% of GDP over the last 20 years. Since labor’s share in income is 67%
in the model, this corresponds to an average labor income tax rate of approximately
10%, and this is the value we used in the calibration.
Given this discussion, we will adopt the following three target values for our
calibration for the year 2000, when τ = 10%:
(a) capital output ratio: 2.4 (annual basis),
(b) the total fertility rate: 2.0 children per woman, and,
23CASH INCOME, OUTGO, AND BALANCES OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY  TRUST FUNDS
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Figure 5: Social Security Receipts and Expenditures/GDP: 1937-2004
(c) the amount of time allocated to rearing children: 3% of family time per child.
The model has trouble matching these targets perfectly.16 When ζ =1 .0, the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption plays a very secondary role.
Our choice of σ =0 .95 and β = .99 (yearly) yields a TFR of 1.82 (lower than the
targeted value of 2.00) and an annual capital-output ratio of about 2.4w h e nτ =0 .10.
These two choices together imply an interest rate of about 2.9% per year, perhaps a
bit on the low side, when α =0 .33.17 For the case in which the time cost (b)i sz e r o ,
we keep all other parameters the same and we set the good cost of rasing children (a)
so that the resulting good cost of raising children as a fraction of per-capita output
turns out to be 4.5 % .T h i si sav a l u ef o rw h i c hw eh a v eah a r dt i m eﬁnding real-world
estimated counterparts, so we picked it only because it was consistent with observed
TFR, capital/output ratios and interest rates at τ = .10 when all other calibrated
parameters remained the same as above.
T h ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e su s e di nt h eb a s e l i n ec a l i b r a t i o na r es u m m a r i z e di nT a b l e2 .
16Calibration for the Barro and Becker model is discussed in the Appendix.
17When, instead, α =0 .22 is used we obtain a K/Y ratio of around 1.4w h i c hi sa l s on o t
dissimilar from the one observed in the data when adjustments are made for residential structures
and consumer durables. This also allows a considerable reduction in ζ still holding γn at about 1,
which corresponds to a TFR of 2.
24Parameter Caldwell model Source
γA 1.012 Dennison
A 1.0 Normalization
α 0.33 or 0.22 RBC or MRW
δ 8% RBC
ζ 1.0 Arbitrary
β 0.99 Targets (a)-(c)
σ 0.95 Targets (a)-(c)
(a,b)( 0 ,3 % )o r( 4 .5%,0) Time use data
Table 2: Model Parameters
5Q u a n t i t a t i v e E ﬀects
In this section, we perform comparative statics by changing the payroll tax over the
interval from zero to 30%, a number consistent with the total employee and employer
Social Security contributions in most European countries. We compare our results
with the data discussed in section 2 to see how well the model ’ﬁts’ the observed
patterns of fertility identiﬁed there. We discuss:
1. For a representative subset of European countries and the US, how much of
the variation in fertility that took place during the 1950-2000 period can be
accounted for by the growth of the national pension system?
2. How much of the persistent USA-Europe diﬀerence in fertility levels of recent
years can be accounted for by the diﬀerences in the size of their public pension
systems?
3. How well do the model predictions compare with our cross sectional and panel
regression results?
We report here results for the Caldwell model, with perfect capital markets. The
corresponding results for the Barro and Becker model, which turn out to be quanti-
tatively quite small, are reported in the Appendix.
5.1 Basic Steady State Calculations
Each of the three questions raised above is addressed by comparing steady state
calculations of fertility changing only the labor income tax rate used to ﬁnance the
pension system (with a corresponding, period-by-period balanced budget change in
lump sum transfers.) For this reason, we begin by presenting and discussing the basic
calculations of comparative steady states that the model implies at our calibrated
parameter values.













Figure 6: Fertility and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
We begin by examining the case in which there are only time costs of having
children. The ﬁgures graph diﬀerent BGP values for a given variable as a function of
the Social Security tax rate. Figures 6-10 plot, in order, the values of γn, K/Y , cm/y
and co/y18, s/y and d and nd corresponding to the values of τ on the horizontal axis.
18Recall they are the same in this parameterization.




















Figure 7: Capital Output Ratio and the SS tax, Caldwell Model




















Figure 8: Consumption of O’s and M’s and the SS tax, Caldwell Model












Figure 9: Savings and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
As we can see, in this framework when the Social Security tax moves from zero
to about 10%, the number of children decreases from about 1.15 to about 0.91 (0.9 if
there are only good costs to raising children), the capital-output ratio increases from
about 2.2 to 2.4, and there is a sizeable decline in consumption of about 3.0% for
both middle aged and old. Finally, donations (both total and per-child) and savings
also decrease. The drop in output caused by the the introduction of social security
is large, roughly a 10% deviation from the undistorted balanced growth path level.
This drop is larger than that for savings, generating an increase in the capital-output
ratios. The drop in fertility is also large as it is equivalent to 0.48 children per woman.
When the Social Security tax is moved further to about 20 − 25%, the number of
children decreases further to about 0.62-0.65, the capital output ratio increases to
2.7-2.8 and per-capita consumption also decreases further.
5.2 Comparisons to the Data
Comparisons between Europe and the US, and across time
Comparing this to US and European data reported in Sections 1 and 2, we see
that the drop predicted by the model is equal to 50% of the observed total drop in
TFR between 1950 and 2000; the latter was about equal to one child per woman in
t h eU Sa n d1 . 3c h i l d r e np e rw o m a ni nE u r o p e .
Recall the basic facts that we want to examine. These are that in the US the TFR
was about 3.0, and in Europe approximately 2.6, in 1950. At this time, the social














Figure 10: Old Age Support and the SS tax, Caldwell Model
security tax rate was approximately τ = 1% in both regions. By 2000, the SS tax
rate in the US had climbed to around 10% while TFR fell to approximately 2.0. In
Europe, both τ and TFR depend on the country, but the relevant range for τ is from
around 20% (e.g., France or Germany) to 25% (Italy).
The model predictions for these quantities are contained in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Model and Data, US 1950, and 2000
Variable USA2000, Data USA2000, Model USA1950, Data USA1950, Model
τ 10% 10% 1% 1%
TFR 2.0 1.82 3.0 2.2
K/Y 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.2
Table 4: Model and Data, Europe in 2000
Variable UK, 2000 UK, Model France, 2000 France, Model
τ 8% 8% 20% 20%
TFR 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.44
K/Y 2.3 (2002) 2.35 2.67 (2002) 2.68
Variable Germany, 2000 Germany, Model Italy, 2000 Italy, Model
τ 20% 20% 25% 25%
TFR 1.35 1.44 1.25 1.30
K/Y 3.0 (2002) 2.68 2.72 2.8
29As can be seen in Table 3, the predicted value for TFR for the US is slightly low;
1.82 at τ = 10%, vs. the targeted value of 2.0. This was discussed in the section on
calibration, and is something that is true for all of the calculated values of TFR from
the model. The model predicts that in 1950 fertility should have been 2.2 in both
the US and in Europe, substantially lower than the actual value of 3.0 in the USA
and 2.6 in Europe. But, the predicted change in TFR is 0.38 children per woman or
about 40% of the actual diﬀerence seen in the US data.
T h er e l e v a n tc o m p a r i s o n sf o rc o u n t r i e slike France and Germany with Social Se-
curity tax rates of τ = 20% are 1.44 for 2000, and 2.2 in 1950. (Here we use the value
τ = 1% for 1950.) Again, the model predictions are systematically too low but as
can be seen the predicted change in fertility is 2.2−1.44 = 0.76 children per woman.
This is 50 to 60% of the observed drop in fertility, depending on the country. Further
increasing τ to 25%, the value for Italy, we can see that the model predicts TFR to
be 1.30, just slightly above the actual value, and about 75% of the observed change
over the 1950 to 2000 period.
As far as comparisons between the US and Europe are concerned, the relevant
comparison is between τ =1 0 %a n dτ ∈ [20%,25%]. As can be seen, this implies
ad i ﬀerence in TFRs of 1.92 − 1.37 = 0.55 children, comparable to the diﬀerences
actually seen.
Comparison to the Regression Results of Section 2
Finally, using the cross section of countries studied in Section 2 we constructed
two subgroups of countries, one with ‘large’ Social Security systems, one with small.19
Variable τ TFR
Low SST, Data 1997 3.6% 2.34
Low SST, Model 3.6% 2.10
US, 2000 10% 2.06
US, Model 10% 1.82
High SST, Data 1997 23.67% 1.47
High SST, Model 23.67% 1.37
Table 5: Model and Data for 3 Groups of Countries
¿From these three tables we can see that the changes predicted by the model are
roughly in line with what is seen in the data. Indeed, the size of fertility diﬀerence
19The countries for the ‘high SST’ group are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, and Sweden. These are all the European countries for which SST/GDP exceeds 14%. The ‘low
SST’ group includes: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Iceland, Ireland, Korea, Panama, and Venezuela.
This is an ad hoc group of countries from the 1997 cross section discussed in section 2. They share
three properties: (i) low SST/GDP (all under 4%), (ii) low IMR’s (between 5 and 20 per 1000), and
(iii) low share of population older than 64 (between 5% and 11%). In our cross country regressions
these are the statistically signiﬁcant variables.
30predicted from the model when moving from the low SST group to the high SST
group is 0.73 children per woman, while that in the data is 0.87 children per woman.
With respect to the cross section regressions presented earlier on, notice that the low
SST group has, roughly, the same IMR rate as the high SST group but much lower
values for the 65% variable: the range is 4.6-11.5, averaging at 7.9%, versus a range of
13.5-17.5 averaging at 15.8% for the high SST group. We should, however, compare
our results also to what we found in our econometric estimates; there, once we control
for infant mortality and the fraction of the population over 65, a 20% increase in the
social security tax is associated with a drop in TFR of between 1.3a n d2 .4 children
per woman. Thus, our model accounts for between 30% and 55% of the observed
diﬀerences in fertility in the overall cross-section.
In the Caldwell-type framework, the quantitative eﬀects of changes in the size of
the social security system are similar for the two alternative cost structures (time costs
and goods costs). This is because in this framework the key mechanism governing
fertility is how fertility translates into transfers to parents, and how sensitive these
are to changes in the number of children. The introduction of a social security system
reduces per-child donations, and hence fertility. The diﬀerence between the two is in
the distortionary eﬀect of taxation on the child-rearing vs. market activities. If the
costs of children is solely in terms of goods, in this framework with inelastic labor
supply, there is no oﬀsetting substitution eﬀect when τ is increased. Thus, the eﬀects
on fertility are larger, if only slightly, in this case.
As an additional dimension along which the two models’ predictions should be
c o m p a r e d ,w en o t et h a tt h eC a l d w e l l - t y p em odel predicts an increase in the capital-
output ratio, while the Barro and Becker model predicts a decrease of the capital-
output ratio as social security increases. In the data, the U.S. capital-output ratio
has either remained constant or increased since early in the 20th century; also, the
capital-output ratio is substantially higher among the European countries, relative
to the U.S., and the European countries have, with the sole exception of the UK,
a substantially higher SST than the U.S. . This lends further empirical support to
Caldwell-type models of fertility as an alternative to dynastic models.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.1 Parameters of Preferences and Technology
The long and the short of the sensitivity analysis results is: varying preference pa-
rameters within reasonable intervals does not change the qualitative predictions of
t h et w om o d e l s ,n o rt h em a g n i t u d eo f∆γn/∆τ as a percentage of the initial value of
γn. It is still and uniformly true that increasing τ from about 0% to 10% decreases
TFR by between 20% and 25% in a Caldwell-type model (the corresponding change
is slightly less than 1% in the Barro-Becker model — see the Appendix). Similarly,
pushing τ from about 10% to 25% decreases TFR by roughly 30% (it is about 5% in
31the Barro-Becker model).
What varies substantially, and sometimes dramatically, with the preference pa-
rameters are the levels of both fertility and the capital-output ratio, and this sensi-
tivity in levels is common to both models.
As illustrated earlier on, at the baseline parameter values the implied TFR is
slightly below the current value of 2.06 in the US for the BJ model; for the Barro and
Becker model, as shown in the Appendix, the values for b (resp. a) needed to match
observations are much larger than the estimated 3% of time. This seems to point to
a lack of richness of the models overall. Clearly, however, a model with features of
both would do much better. Since the aim of this paper is partially to compare the
two models, this was not attempted.
Our ﬁndings for changes in the parameters governing technology are similar to
those for preferences: small changes in either α, γA, a, b,o rδ bring about changes
in fertility and in the capital-output ratio that are sometimes substantial. However,
they leave the comparative static results basically unaltered when it comes to fertility.
Indeed, in the BJ model, reducing the time cost of children from the b =3 %v a l u e
adopted in the baseline case to values slightly higher than b =2 %s u ﬃces to make
the predicted level of fertility to match current averages in the U.S., i.e. about 2.06
per woman. This choice may be justiﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a ti no u rm o d e lt h ee ﬀective
time cost of having children is artiﬁcially increased by the assumption that, with only
three periods, the length of working life is equal to that of the retirement period. As
explained above, this is a gross distortion of the real world, where the number of years
spent working is roughly twice the number of years spent in retirement. Because of
this fact, one may argue that b = 2% is a preferable baseline calibration for the BJ-
type setting; should this choice be made, our model can easily match current U.S.
fertility levels when τ = 10% and the remaining parameters are as in Table 2, without
aﬀecting any of the comparative statics results.
One experiment that is of particular interest is the eﬀects of changes in the growth
rate of productivity. Our value of 1.012 is fairly low and is based on Dennison’s work,
which makes substantial adjustments for the observed changes in labor quality. We
also performed our baseline experiments on the eﬀects of changes in τ on γn for values
of γA up to and including 1.02. These gave rise to very similar results: when the size
of the SST increases from zero to ten percent, fertility drops of almost half a child
per woman.
Another alteration that is particularly relevant concerns changing α. In the house-
hold production literature (which treats the stock of housing and durables as inputs
into the production of home goods, and removes the housing service component from
GNP) an estimate of α = .22 has been found in McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright
(1997). Recalibrating the BJ model to this target does not change the overall eﬀects
of changes in Social Security on fertility, but it does greatly enhance our ability to
hit the targets set out in the previous section. In particular, with α = .22, γn =1 ,i s
attainable even with ζ = .65 (see Schoonbroodt (2004)). When this alternative cali-
32bration is adopted for the dynastic model, increasing the social security tax rate still
increases fertility, and still only very marginally. In the BJ-type model, increasing
the social security tax rate reduces fertility of more or less the same percentage as in
t h eb a s el i n em o d e l .
6.2 The Role of Financial Markets Imperfections
In our version of the BJ model the parameter ξ ∈ (0,1) measures the extent to which
ﬁnancial market imperfections prevent middle age individuals from using private sav-
i n ga sam e a n so fﬁnancing late age consumption. In the baseline model we assumed
ξ =0 ,s ot h a tﬁnancial markets are functioning perfectly. As reported in the introduc-
tion, a number of empirical studies have found evidence that diﬀerent measures of the
ability to save for retirement are strongly correlated with fertility decisions. In fact, a
study by Cigno and Rosati using Italian and German micro data have estimated that
the impact of ﬁnancial market accessibility on fertility is comparable to that of public
pensions: the easier it is to save for retirement, the lower is fertility. In the BJ model
the intuition for this result is simple: in the equation for the equilibrium donations
(see Section 3) the terms (1 − ξ)Rtxt and To
t are interchangeable — a variation in ξ
has the same eﬀect as a change in the public pension transfer. The more imperfect
capital markets are, the less valuable physical capital is for ﬁnancing consumption
in late age and, therefore, the more valuable children are in this regard. One would
expect, then, that when ξ > 0 fertility would be higher than in the baseline case; the
question is: how much higher?
The answer, reﬂected in Figure 11, is: a lot higher. Figure 11 plots the mapping
from the pair (τ,ξ) ∈ [0.0,0.25] × [0.0,0.20] into the equilibrium values of γn,w h i l e
Figure 12 has K/Y on the vertical axis and the same two parameters on the horizontal
plane. As the reader can verify, even small changes in the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial
markets make children a very valuable form of investment. This in turn pushes
fertility to levels similar to those observed in the earlier part of the 20th century. In
quantitative terms, we ﬁnd that, even in the presence of a social security system of
roughly the same magnitude as the current one, a reduction in the rate of return on
capital of about 20% (ξ =0 .2) would increase fertility 30%, or 0.66 more children
per woman in our setting. Equally important, the same degree of ﬁnancial market
ineﬃciency leads to a substantial decrease in aggregate savings resulting in a K/Y
ratio which is almost 50% lower than in the baseline case. These are large eﬀects by
historical standards.
Financial instruments through which one can reliably save for retirement are lim-
ited both historically in the developed countries and currently in the developing coun-
tries. It is diﬃcult to know if changing ξ f r o m0t o0 .2 corresponds to an interesting
quantitative exercise without further data work. But, the fact that the eﬀects that




























































Figure 12: K/Y, SS tax and ξ, Caldwell Model
347C o n c l u s i o n
A number of authors have suggested that the welfare state, and the public pension
system in particular, might be an important factor behind the drop in fertility to
the bare (or even below) replacement levels most western countries are experiencing.
Controlling for infant mortality, income level, and female labor force participation,
almost all regression exercises, including ours, point to a strong negative correlation
between the size of the Social Security system and the Total Fertility Rate, both
across countries and over time. In particular, we observe the following: fertility rates
were much higher in the USA and Europe around 1950, when both groups of countries
had a much smaller pension system than they do; since the late 1970s fertility rates
have been persistently lower in Europe than in the USA, and the former countries
have a substantially larger pension system than the latter.
In this paper we test the ability of two models of endogenous fertility to replicate
this correlation when they are calibrated to match other very elementary facts of
the US economy. The results are mixed. We ﬁnd that in models based on parental
altruism changes in the size of Social Security systems like those we have seen over
the last 100 years generate only small (and typically positive) eﬀects on fertility. In
contrast, models based on the ‘old age security’ motive for fertility are more in accord
with the patterns seen in the data. Although imperfect, even simple, calibrated
models of this type account between 40% and 60% of the observed diﬀerences in
fertility over time in the U.S. or between the U.S. and other developed countries.
Since the introduction of government funded pension systems has a much larger
eﬀect on incentives at the lower end of the income distribution, this ﬁnding is also
consistent with the observation that the reduction in fertility over this period has
been much larger for poorer households.
In addition to this, we study the eﬀects of improved access to savings instruments
on fertility. We ﬁnd that even small improvements in rates of return (on the order of
20%) have the potential to account for about 50% of the observed changes in fertility
over time. This channel is one which requires more exploration, but, apparently it is
quite powerful.
Taken together then, we ﬁnd that these two eﬀects account for between 50% and
100% of the drop in fertility in the U.S. from 3.0 children per woman to 2.0 over the
period from 1920 to now.
References
[1] Barro, Robert J. and Gary S. Becker, 1989, “Fertility Choice in a Model of
Economic Growth,” Econometrica,v o l .5 7 ,p p .4 8 1 - 5 0 1 .
[2] Becker, Gary S. and Robert J. Barro, 1988, “A Reformulation of the Theory of
Fertility,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,v o l .1 0 3 ,p p .1 - 2 5 .
35[3] Adsera, A., 2004, “Changing fertility rates in developed countries. The impact
o fl a b o rm a r k e ti n s t i t u t i o n s , ”Journal of Population Economics,v o l .1 7 ,p p .1 - 2 7
[4] Bental, Benjamin, 1989, “The Old Age Security Hypothesis and Optimal Popu-
lation Growth,” Journal of Population Economics, vol. 1, pp. 285-301.
[5] Boldrin, Michele B. M. and Larry E. Jones, 2002, “Mortality, Fertility and Saving
in Malthusian Economy,” Review of Economic Dynamics,v o l .5 ,p .7 7 5 - 8 1 4 .
[6] Caldwell, John C., 1978, “A Theory of Fertility: from High Plateau to Destabi-
lization,” Population and Development Review, vol. 4, pp. 553-577.
[7] Caldwell, John C., 1982, Theory of Fertility Decline, New York: Academic Press.
[8] Cigno, Alessandro, 1991, Economics of the Family, Oxford University Press:
Oxford and New York.
[9] Cigno, Alessandro, 1995, “Public Pensions with Endogenous Fertility: Com-
ment,” Journal of Public Economics,v o l .5 7 ,p p .1 6 9 - 1 7 3 .
[10] Cigno, Alessandro, Luca Casolaro and Furio C. Rosati, 2002-2003, “The Impact
of Social Security on Saving and Fertility in Germany,” FinanzArchiv,v o l .5 9 ,
pp. 189-211.
[11] Cigno, Alessandro and Furio Camillo Rosati, 1992, “The Eﬀects of Financial
Markets and Social Security on Saving and Fertility Behavior in Italy,” Journal
of Population Economics, vol. 5, pp. 319-41.
[12] Cigno, Alessandro and Furio Camillo Rosati, 1996, “Jointly determined saving
and fertility behavior: theory and estimates for Germany, Italy, UK, and USA,”
European Economic Review, vol 40, pp. 1561-1589.
[13] Echevarria, Cristina and Antonio Merlo, 1999, “Gender Diﬀerences in Education
in a Dynamic Household Bargaining Model,” International Economic Review,
vol. 40, pp. 265-286.
[14] Ehrilich, Isaac and J. Kim, 2005, ”Social Security, Demographic Trends and
Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence from the International Experience,”
SUNY Buﬀalo Working Paper.
[15] Ehrlich, Isaac and F. Lui, 1991, “Intergenerational Trade, Longevity, Intrafamily
Transfers and Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 99, 1029-59.
[16] Ehrlich, I. and F. Lui, 1998, ”Social Security, the Family and Economic Growth,”
Economic Inquiry, vol. 36, pp. 390-409.
36[17] Friedlander, S. and M. Silver, 1967, “A Quantitative Study of the Determinants
of Fertility Behavior,” Demography,v o l .4 ,p p .3 0 - 7 0 .
[18] Greenwood, J., A., A. Seshadri, and G. Vandenbroucke (2005), ”The Baby Boom
and Baby Bust,” forthcoming, American Economic Review.
[19] Gruber, J. and D.A. Wise (eds), 1999, Social Security and Retirement around
the World, The University of Chicago Press for the NBER.
[20] Hohm, Charles F., 1975, “Social Security and Fertility: An International Per-
spective,” Demography, vol. 12, pp. 629-44.
[ 2 1 ]J u s t e r ,F .T h o m a sa n dF r a n kP .S t a ﬀord, 1991, ”The Allocation of Time: Em-
pirical Findings, Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement”, Journal of
Economic Literature, vol. 29, pp. 471-522.
[22] Haines, Michael R., 1994, ”The Population of the United States, 1790 to 1920,”
NBER Historical Paper No. 56.
[23] Leibenstein, H., 1957, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth,N e w
York: Wiley.
[24] Maddison, A., 1995a, Monitoring the World Economy,O E C D ,P a r i s .
[25] Maddison, A., 1995b, “Standardized Estimates of Fixed Capital Stock: A Six
Country Comparison,” in Explaining the Economic Performance of Nations,E d -
ward Elgar, Aldershot, pp.137-66.
[26] McGrattan, Ellen, Richard Rogerson and Randall Wright, 1997, “An Equilib-
rium Model of the Business Cycle with Household Production and Fiscal Policy,”
International Economic Review,v o l .3 8 ,p p .2 6 7 - 9 0 .
[27] Mochida, Mogumi, 2005, ”Child Allowances, Fertility and Uncertain Lifetime,”
Osaka University Working Paper.
[28] Moe, Karine S., 1998, “Fertility, Time Use, and Economic Development,” Review
of Economic Dynamics, vol. 1, pp. 699-718.
[29] National Academy of Sciences, Oﬃce of the Foreign Secretary, 1971, Rapid Pop-
ulation Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications, The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press: Baltimore.
[30] Nishimura, Kazuo and Junsen Zhang, 1992, “Pay-As-You-Go Public Pensions
with Endogenous Fertility,” Journal of Public Economics,” vol. 48, pp. 239-258.
[31] Oliveira Peires, J. and F. Garcia, 2004, “Productivity of Nations: a Stochastic
Frontier Approach to TFP Decomposition,” mimeo, Escola de Economia—Sao
Paulo, Fundacao Getulio Vargas—Rio de Janeiro.
37[32] Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın Ignacio, and Andres Romeu, 2003, “Are Children Investment of
Consumption Goods? Evidence from ChildH e a l t ha n dP a r e n t a lC a r e . ” ,m i m e o ,
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, January.
[33] Prinz, Aloys, 1990, “Endogenous Fertility, Altruistic Behavior Across Genera-
tions, and Social Security Systems,” Journal of Population Economics,v o l .3 ,
pp. 179-92.
[34] Rendall, Michael S. and Raisa, Bahchieva, 1998, “An Old-Age Security Motives
for Fertility in the US?” Population and Development Review, vol. 24, pp. 293-
307
[35] Rosati, Furio Camillo, 1996, “Social Security in a Non-Altruistic Model with
Uncertainty and Endogenous Fertility,” Journal of Public Economics,v o l .6 0 ,
pp. 283-94.
[36] Schoonbroodt, Alice, 2004, “Mortality, Fertility, and Female Labor Supply in
the USA, 1880-2000”. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, in progress.
[37] Swidler, Steve, 1981, “Social Security, Fertility and Saving,” Ph.D. Dissertation,
Brown University.
[38] Swidler, Steve, 1983, “An Empirical Test of the Eﬀect of Social Security on
Fertility in the United States,” American Economist,v o l .2 7 ,p p .5 0 - 5 7 .
[39] Veall, M. R., 1986, “Public Pensions as Optimal Social Contracts,” Journal of
Public Economics, vol. 31, pp. 237-251.
[40] Wigger, Berthold U., 1999, “Pay-as-You-Go Financed Public Pensions in a Model
of Endogenous Growth and Fertility,” Journal of Population Economics, vol. 12,
pp. 625-40.
[41] Yakita, Akira, 2001, “Uncertain Lifetime, Fertility and Social Security,” Journal
of Population Economics, vol. 14, pp. 635-40.
[42] Yoon, Yeopil and Gabriel Talmain, 2001, “Endogenous Fertility, Endogenous
Growth and Public Pension System: Should We Switch from a Pay-As-You-Go
to a Fully Funded System?,” Manchester School, vol. 69, no. 5, Special Issue,
pp. 586-605.
[43] Zhang, Jie, 2001, “Long-Run Implications of Social Security Taxation for Growth
and Fertility,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 67, pp. 713-24.
[44] Zhang, Junsen, Jie Zhang and Ronald Lee, 2001, “Mortality Decline and Long-
Run Growth,” Journal of Public Economics, vol. 80, pp. 485-507.
388 Appendix
8.1 Social Security in the B&B Model of Fertility
In this section, we develop the equations determining the fertility eﬀects of a social
security system in the BB model. There is a basic problem with trying to study
Social Security in a BB model. This is that they assume that people only live two
periods, youth and adulthood, and hence there is no time when the middle aged can
be taxed to ﬁnance consumption of the old. Because of this, we will adapt the model
to allow for three period lives. As above, we assume that individuals work when they
are middle aged, but do not when they are old. As in this case we want to consider
also the impact of a lump sum pension system, let Tm
t denote the lump sum tax on
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As above, we let
θt(τt)=at +( 1− τt)bwt = at + b(τt)wt,




































t+1(θt + kt+1) ≤ N
m







Since we want to model the Social Security system as transferring money from
workers to retirees, we have that Tm
t < 0, and To
t > 0. Note that we have assumed
39that although the tax variables, τt, Tm
t ,a n dTo
t are taken as given, the dynasty head
understands that changing Nm
t (for example), changes both his tax obligation and
his transfer receipts. Hence, even when τt = 0, this assumption de facto, makes the
Social Security System not lump sum, as a distortionary tax and transfer pair (Tm
t ,
and To
t+1) is being applied on the endogenous variable Nm
t . An alternative formulation
would have the head taking total transfers in each period as given, independently of
the fertility choice. Note that, when the total transfer is independent of the dynasty’s





t for all t. This is no longer true when Tm
t ,a n dTo
t are given
on a per-capita basis, and the dynasty understands that increasing current fertility
raises taxes today and transfers tomorrow. In these circumstances a PAYGO pension
system may distort fertility choices in either directions, depending on parameter
values. To see this notice that, setting τt =0f o ra l lt, a simple manipulation of






It reduces fertility (because it raises the cost of having children) if −Rt+1Tm
t >T 0
t+1
and it promotes fertility in the opposite case. As the sequences for Tm
t ,a n dTo
t need
not be constant, the distortion may go in either direction during diﬀerent periods.
The PAYGO constraint, assuming it treats all dynasties symmetrically, allows one to










Along a balanced growth path, this means that
R = γNγA
must hold as per capita transfers must grow at the same rate as income per capita
grow along a BGP. Dynamic eﬃciency, though, requires that
R>γNγA =1+g
as the right hand side is the growth rate of the aggregate economy. Hence, along
dynamically eﬃcient balanced growth paths, lump sum public pensions have a nega-
tive direct eﬀect on fertility, and vice versa along dynamically ineﬃcient ones. Notice
t h a t ,e i t h e rw a y ,t h ee ﬀect is permanent: everything else the same, a balanced growth
path with Tm
t ,a n dTo
t diﬀerent from zero should have a lower (higher) value for γN
than one without. The result makes economic sense: the pension system we are
considering is tantamount to a tax on fertility, at least when R>1+g.




t τtwt(1 − bNm
t+1) is the PAYGO budgetary restriction; to keep as
close as possible with the standard Barro-Becker formulation we also assume that
40g(N)=Nη and u(c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ).20 Retaining the notation from the previous
section and assuming the same production function we get (after some algebra) that










A = βR,( 1 7 )
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o + γnˆ c
m + γ
2
n(ˆ a + b(1 − τ)ˆ w + γAˆ k)=γn[(1 − τ)ˆ w + Rˆ k]+ˆ T
o,( 1 9 )
R =( 1− δ)+Fk(ˆ k,1 − bγn), (20)
ˆ w = F`(ˆ k,1 − bγn), (21)
ˆ T
o = γnτ ˆ w(1 − bγn). (22)
Comparing equation (17) with the neutrality restriction derived above for the
lump-sum case, we can see that, depending on the value of the discount factor β,
the general equilibrium eﬀect can push the inequality either way; the same equation
also shows, once again, that steady state fertility only depends on the preference
parameters η, β, σ, the growth rate of exogenous technological progress γA and the
equilibrium interest rate. Therefore, as in the BJ framework, all other parameters,
including the size of the social security system, and the costs of having children, only
impact fertility indirectly through the interest rate. These eﬀects are thus absent in
presence of ﬁxed prices. In sum then, also this model does not deliver an explicit
and unambiguous prediction about the direction of the eﬀect of the introduction of a
PAYGO social security system on fertility and the growth rate of population. Thus,
any eﬀect can only be identiﬁed through a more thorough, quantitative exercise. This
is what we turn to next.
8.1.1 Calibrating the Barro and Becker Model






















As with the Caldwell model we assume that the production function is CRS with
constant depreciation, and is given by:
(1 − δ)K + F(K,L)=( 1− δ)K + AK
αL
1−α
20Monotonicity and concavity place some restrictions on the allowable values of η and σ.T h e s e
are σ < 1, 1 < η + σ < 2, and 0 < η < 1. See the appendix for details.
41There are a total of ten parameters in the model, nine of which are in common with
the BJ model, while the tenth, η ∈ (0,1), is speciﬁc to the BB model.
We set the parameters of technology as in the BJ model. These include A, δ, α
and γA. Following our choice in the BJ model, we set the relative weights on the ﬂow
utility from current consumption of the old (ζ)t ob eo n e .
Given these choices, we still need to determine the values of the four parameters
β, σ, a,a n db, as in the BJ model and we must also choose a value of η.T om a k e
our results as clear as possible, for each model we consider two extreme cases: one
in which all of the costs of raising children are in terms of goods (b = 0), the other
in which they are completely in terms of time ( a = 0). This implies calibrating four
parameters. Our method for accomplishing this follows closely the description for the
BJ model. We choose parameters to match facts for fertility, capital/output ratios
from US data in 2000, with τ = 10%.
For ease of comparisons with the results of the BJ model we chose ζ =1 .0, σ =0 .95
and β = .99. There are, as mentioned earlier, restrictions on these parameters: σ < 1,
and σ+η > 1. Given these restrictions, we were not able to set the time cost of having
children anywhere near what one would call “realistic” values while, at the same time,
m a t c h i n gaT F Ro f2 .0 for any value of τ in the relevant range. To match targets
for fertility, etc., we must set the time cost of having a child to 33% of the available
time. Even then, the parameter η needs to be set as low as possible to keep fertility
at a reasonable level in the BB model. When we set b to zero, the level of child care
costs that this requires is a = 27% of per capita income.
The parameter values used in the calibration are summarized in Table 7 where
we also include the parameter values for the BJ model for comparison.
Parameter BJ model B and B model Source
γA 1.012 1.012 Dennison
A 1.0 1.0 Normalization
α 0.33 or 0.22 0.33 or 0.22 RBC or MRW
δ 8% 8% RBC
ζ 1.0 1.0 Arbitrary
β 0.99 0.96 Targets (a)-(c)
σ 0.95 0.95 Targets (a)-(c)
η n/a 0.12 Targets (a)-(c)
(a,b)( 0 ,3 % )o r( 4 .5%,0) (0,33%) or (27%,0) Required for TFR
Table 7: Parameter Values for the B&B Model
8.1.2 Quantitative Eﬀects in the B&B Model
Leaving aside the obvious eﬀects on output and wealth that the introduction of a
distortionary tax causes, the impact of Social Security on fertility rates in the BB
f r a m e w o r ki ss u b s t a n t i a l l yd i ﬀerent, almost opposite, from the one we have observed


















Figure 13: Fertility and the SS tax, B&B Model
in the data. Figure 13 plots the values taken in the BB model by γn as τ varies.
Indeed, whether fertility increases or decreases in the BB model when Social Security
is introduced depends on whether households need mainly goods or time to raise
children. If mainly time is needed to raise children, fertility increases as the size of
the Social Security program increases, which is the case reported in Figure 13. Notice
that the increase is basically insigniﬁcant; in the case reported, for example, TFR
increases of about 0.05 children as the Social Security tax goes from zero to ten per
cent. Conversely, if only goods are needed to raise children, the introduction of Social
Security decreases the number of children per woman by about 0.014. These eﬀects
are orders of magnitude smaller than those seen in the data. The eﬀects on capital
accumulation and consumption (of both middle-aged and old) go in the opposite
direction, but are also quantitatively small.21 The donations eﬀect is missing in this
framework, and the diﬀerent impact on fertility depending on type of cost needed
to raise children is due to distortionary taxation: time spend raising children is not
taxed, while time spent working is taxed.
The basic reason for the small eﬀects on fertility in the BB model is that in
a balanced PAYGO system, the eﬀects of transfers are netted out by the dynasty
planner. Thus, as noted above, if the system was funded entirely through lump sum
taxation and its internal rate of return was not dissimilar from the rate of return on
21Details available from the authors upon request.
43capital, the eﬀects would be literally zero. If child-rearing requires time, however,
there is a change due to, as discussed above, a change in the eﬀective relative prices
of the two uses for time, work and childcare. This eﬀect is typically small, however,
and present only if the cost of children is in terms of time, hence the resulting eﬀect
on fertility is also small. An additional eﬀect is also present. This is that, even when
the costs are entirely in terms of goods, the dynasty views per capita transfers as
ﬁxed, whereas in equilibrium, through the government budget constraint, these are
determined by average fertility across dynasties. This connection is not recognized
by the individual dynasty however, and is the sole reason why, with only goods cost
of children, the eﬀect of changes in social security are not exactly zero.
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